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Nick DeGenova’s study does more than expose the poverty of intersectionality—
that sociological theory that posits the importance of considering race, class, and
gender and sexuality together as they interact with each other as independent
variables. It allows us to move from the most common and least correct criticism of
intersectionality, that it is a theory that contains class within a functionalist
sociological universe, to a much bolder contention. The contention is this: class
contains. It is class that contains the surplus, the commons, of race, gender and
sexuality. It is class that tames. This is because class is the category in capital that is
not, and it marks life, and energy, and matter, as limit. Of course, much of our own
Marxist analysis has had trouble with this limit, denying it either by filling it with
sociology, as Erik Olin Wright did for instance, or demanding of it utopian
transformation, as in the recent turns of Slavoj Zizek or Alain Badiou. But this
Marxist analysis is not true to Marx. For Marx, class contained.
How else really to interpret the class in itself and class for itself formula of Marx
himself? A class in itself is not yet something lived positively, but a class for itself is
already no longer livable and must be abolished. Rather than class being livable, we
might say it is impossible to live class positively and therefore politically. It is, as
Marx often reminded us, a relation of limit in the world and can only be lived
negatively, only lived as limit.
This is not to say that class is not a lived experience, but rather that it is always at
the same time an uninhabitable one. Or, to put this another way, we might compare
chains. The chains of chattel slavery needed to be broken so that life already in
chains, already there, could be liberated. But the chains of the proletariat contain no
such actuality, and instead hold back something that is not yet there, some
transformation of those in chains into some kind of new man. This is not the case for
abolition where on the contrary the man and woman are already there, restrained.
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It is for this reason that abolition of prisons today contains an important political
lesson. People do not need to be fixed, do not need to be changed. They need to be
freed. This is a point that Fred Moten and I make in the context now of this age of
governance, this age of policy where anyone who does not exhibit a willingness to
change, to improve, to submit oneself to a radical contingency cannot enter into the
kingdom of governance and must instead have policy applied to them, to fix them,
by those in governance. To be in governance is to display a set of articulated
interests that can be taken up and put to work, but it is also to display an indifference
to those interests, a pragmatism about them that suits the radically contingent
capitalism for which one is preening.
Class fixes. It is capital’s original policy. Just think of the kind of objection to
what I am saying that begins: but without class consciousness, race and even gender
can become mere nationalisms, counter-revolutionary even. What is the function of
class in this objection? It is nothing but policy. It is there to fix a racial
consciousness, or a gendered solidarity, or a sexual performance that left to its own
devices would be uncontainable. Class tames, and it does so in a way exactly the
opposite of its claim.
And here, intersectionality for all its stupidity as a sociological theory is onto
something. Class analysis wants to be the animation of race, of gender, and of
sexuality, and class analysis chafes at the equality of inputs posited by
intersectionality, which restrict its leadership in unwanted ways. But intersection-
ality knows more about class analysis than it knows about itself. Because what does
class analysis do but say to race, to gender, to sexuality: there is a limit? I am that
limit. And more than that, it says, I am a category like you. And class is a category.
It does have a limit. It is a limit relation. But race does not, nor gender, nor
sexuality, nor any number of expressions of sociality and subjectivity that we might
name. Their potential is to be beyond category. Their very quality is difference,
limitlessness.
Indeed, they are potentially limitless because they are always potentially
uncategorizable, always potentially not limit relations. It is ironically class analysis,
and more prosaically theories like intersectionality that prevent race from becoming
blackness for instance, or try to, as they would attempt to prevent gender from
becoming something like affective being or sexuality desirous performance. Freed
of the need to conform to an identity category, race has historically, through for
instance the black radical tradition as Cedric Robinson names it, produced its
revolutionary surplus, its common, its fugitive hideaways, regardless of race, though
never without regard for that history that is race. Queer performance similarly
cannot be trusted to contain itself but instead samples performance beyond its
category, leveraging performance everywhere. To insist on the need to read class
into different drag performances in different settings, whether in the service of class
analysis or sociology, is useful only to the extent that class precisely does not lead
but follows this performance as the drag, the limit, as that which must be overcome
for the performance to have an encore.
Sadly in this containment, class analysis repeats the policy prescription of
bourgeois sociology. The diagnosis in conventional Marxist circles is not enough
class consciousness, just as the diagnosis for Kennedy School policy hustlers has
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always been not enough bourgeois consciousness, whether in the form of no work
ethic, no family values, or no credit worthiness. Indeed, class analysis’s problem of
consciousness is nothing other than a problem of its own consciousness, as this
analysis is most evident in the bourgeois sphere. Because when one says race or
gender in the bourgeois sphere, one already says politics: the political threat of using
these terms, even in their categorical reductions, is already apparent. Not true for
class. The whole point of class as something positive is that it is only positive for
capital, which is to say it can exist in the bourgeois sphere without politics and
without threat. Race and gender, contrary to the false consciousness of class
analysis, cannot. Their elaboration is always potentially at odds with capital, even if
in practice differential inclusion is often possible, even desirable for capital. They
are positive principles of association, positive principles of elaboration even in the
bourgeois sphere, in a way that class can only be for capital. For itself, class cannot
be but must yield to associations of a positive nature. It is no wonder that race and
gender continue to cause more politics in the world than class, to the consternation
of the class analysts. If it needs to be stressed, and I hope at this point it does not,
this is not because class is not the dominant limit on life, but again because people
left to their own devices will try to make something positive out of their lives, and
for that purpose, people use positive categories, categories that can be exceeded,
developed, cultivated.
Finally, it is in this respect that Italian post-workerist thought holds out the
prospect of recognizing the dominance of class without class analysis, without
imagining that it is through class that life can be lived or worse, fixed. In its notion
of a flight from work, a refusal of work, we have a politics that can remind us that
class cannot be inhabited positively but instead must be vacated for what is already
going on, always going on. Flight and refusal in post-workerist thought, as
originally for the black radical tradition, do not imply the transformation of she who
flees into a life for herself and out of a life in herself. They imply, rather, that she
already has something worth holding on to, that she is fleeing with it in her arms,
that she is refusing to give it up, and at her heels is capital brandishing the wicked
limit of class. She does not need to be fixed. She has something valuable in her arms
already, on her arms, in her armory. She may have blackness, sexuality, something
she is elaborating on the run, with others, and for them class is common only as the
enemy. What Nick DeGenova’s study evokes is how that enemy can be exposed as
not just class, but class analysis.
Comment on DeGenova’s ‘‘Management of Quality’’ 281
123
